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Nature of the case 
The portion of this case under appeal are motions that were denied in the Magistrate 
Court, appealed and denied in the District Court, and now appealed to the Supreme Court; those 
motions being 1) Change of and/or new orders pursuant to IRCP 60, 2) change of venue, 3) 
Holding Defendant in contempt, and 4) Disqualification of Magistrate Judge Gary DeMeyer with 
cause. The Appellant has made numerous collateral attacks on a judgment asserted to have been 
made under color of law, without jurisdiction, while ignoring fundamental civil rights, and 
tantamount to a termination of parental rights without any cause whatsoever, while being assisted 
by other magistrate and district courts in the Third Judicial District and numerous officers of 
those courts before and after the trial in CV-2014-7409 in Canyon County that was consolidated 
with CV-2014-3311 in Adams County. Evidence to numerous wrongful and/or erroneous acts, 
fully demonstrable on court records, have been presented in said collateral attackt, but were 
dismissed without consideration or hearing. 
Course of the Proceedings 
CV - 2012 - 6404 in Canyon County, CPO filed on July 02, 2012, and dismissed on the 
Hearing date July 12, 2012 by petitioner, Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) 
CV - 2014 - 6865 in Canyon County, filed on July 1, 2014 by petitioner Ronald Van 
Hook, with temp CPO granted. Respondent could not be located to be served, Petitioner filed for 
Legal Separation and custody at the same time in CV-2014-7409. Court ordered this to go to 
publication. On Aug. 18, 2014, service by publication for CV-2014-7409 was complete and 
effective, but there was not effective service on CV-2014-6865. 
CV - 2014 - 8801 in Canyon County-Aug. 25, 2014, CPO by petitioner Ronald Van 
Hook, Dismissed by Court presided over by Gary DeMeyer. 
CV - 2014 - 7049 in Canyon County, Legal Separation and child custody awarded to 
plaintiff Ronald Van Hook, after Service was completed 8-18-14, Motion for Default on 9-8-14 
and Default hearing on 9-11-14. 
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CV-2014-9041 in Canyon County, CPO filed by Ronald Van Hook and dismissed by 
Court. 
CV - 2014- 3311 in Adams County, CPO filed by Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on 9-
04-14. On 09-18-14 hearing set out to 10-02-14 so petitioner could get an attorney. Hearing 
held on 10-02-14 and continued after court ordered hair follicle drug test and CPS investigation. 
Hearing on 10-27-14 with CPO granted to petitioner until June 14, 2016, but CPO did not extend 
to the children, and full custody of children awarded to petitioner, overturning decision in 
Canyon County CV-2104-7409. 
CV - 2014 - 11708 in Canyon County, CPO filed by Ronald Van Hook on 11-14-2014 
and Dismissed by Court presided over by Gary DeMeyer. 
CV - 2014- 6865 in Canyon County, Motion to Reinstate Protection Order, alternatively 
Motion for Protection Order, filed by Ronald Van Hook through his Attorney Steven Fisher, on 
11-14-2014, but not set to hearing. 
CV - 2014- 7049 in Canyon County, Defendants Motion to set aside Legal Separation on 
10-15-14, and Motion in Limine (from CPS investigation in Adams County CV-2014-3311) on 
10-24-14. Ex Parte Restraining order issued on 3-25-14. Temp. Orders were issued and Steven 
Fisher was given leave from the case on 4-16-14, and Case became consolidated with Adams 
County case CV-2014-3311. Multiple Motions filed by Plaintiff prose, including objection to 
restraining order, objection to temp orders, motion to disqualify judge with cause, motion for 
Guardian Ad Litem (with court requiring the posting of a $20,000 bond), and request for order 
for polygraph examination of both parties; all of plaintiffs motions denied and/or dismissed by 
the court. Case went to trial and Decree of Divorce entered on 9-9-15 giving sole legal custody 
of the minor children to the defendant. 
CV-2015-0678, presided over by judge D. Grober in Owyhee County- Petition for 
Temporary Restraining Order with Affidavit and Motion for fee waiver was filed on 9-11-2015. 
Fee waiver was granted and Motion for restraining order was denied without hearing on 9-11-15. 
CV - 2014- 7049 in Canyon County, Defendant retained Virginia Bond as attorney on 9-
12-15 who made Court appearance on 9-23-15 when motions for New Trail and Reconsideration 
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were filed. On 11-17-15, motions were set to hearing for 1-14-16. Motions were withdrawn on 
12-22-15 and new motion was filed for a change of venue on 12-30-16. On 1-28-16, Motion for 
change of venue was denied. On 3-8-16, attorney Virginia Bond filed to talce leave from the 
case, which was granted on 3-17-16. Ronald Van Hook prose, filed motion to Disqualify Judge 
DeMeyer with cause on 4-1-16, and the motion was denied on 4-21-16. 
CV - 2016 - 5044 in Canyon County was a petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Habeas 
Corpus, filed on 5-27-16 and presided over by Judge Vandervelde, with the Motions becoming 
Bifurcated, Mandamus dismissed and Habeas Corpus changing venue to Adams County on 12-
16-16. 
CV-2014-7409 Notice of Appeal to the District Court was filed on 6-1-16, Appealing the 
Magistrate Courts Decision to Dismiss the Motion to Disqualify Judge DeMeyer with cause. 
The appeal was presided over by Judge D. McKee, was briefed by both parties, heard and 
ultimately denied on 10-14-16. The case was handed back to Judge DeMeyer. 
CV-2014-7409 on 10-20-16, Plaintiffs Motion for Change of and/or New Orders was 
· filed pursuant to IRCP 60. Criminal Contempt charges were brought against Defendant Cannon 
and a Motion for Change of Venue. A Hearing was held on 11-3-16 with Judge Howard Smyser 
presiding. Defendant Cannon failed to appear at the arraignment for Contempt, and the Court 
accepted a not guilty plea from Kimberli Stretch, Attorney for Defendant. All other Motions 
were not heard and reset to be heard by Judge DeMeyer. On 11-3-16, there was an Order setting 
case and Scheduling Order for the Contempt Charges against Defendant signed by Judge 
DeMeyer. On 11-7-16, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and Motion to Disqualify 
Judge DeMeyer with cause. Defendant filed motions to dismiss. On 12-8-16, All Motions were 
dismissed by the Court, presided over by Gary DeMeyer, who granted attorney fees to Kimberli 
Stretch. On 12-15-16, Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal to the District Court. 
On 1-27-17, Kimberli Stretch filed a Motion for Referral to Administrative Judge for 
Vexatious Litigation, which was heard on 2-14-17 by Judge Ford, who stated at the conclusion 
of the Hearing that a decision would be made within 30 days. 
Appellants Brief was filed on 1-30-2017. Respondents Brief was filed on 1-30-2017 
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(Respondents Brief remains missing from the record sent to the Supreme Court after the Court 
Record was objected to on 7-10-17) Appellants Response filed 3-3-17 and Memorandum 
Decision on Appeal was filed 3-20-17. The Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court was then 
filed on4-3-17. 
Continued action was taken on Case CV-2014-7409 after the Notice of Appeal was filed 
with the Supreme Court as follows ... 
CV - 2017 - 3664 in Adams County was a Habeas Corpus action (from the changed 
venue from Canyon County in CV-2016-5044) presided over by Judge C. Nye, set to hearing on 
June 23,2016, but dismissed on June 21, 2016 and hearing vacated. 
CV - 2016 - 11807 in Canyon County was a civil Complaint for Damages, filed on 12-1-
16 by Ronald Van Hook Plaintiff against Defendants Gary DeMeyer, Mary Grant and Kimberli 
Stretch of Idaho Legal Aid, Steven Fisher, Virginia Bond and Dawn Cannon (fka) Van Hook. 
Multiple motions to dismiss were filed, and all Defendants motions were granted with the 
exception of Dawn Cannon that remains a defendant in this case, after her motion for 
reconsideration on 4-27-17 was denied on 7-19-17. 
Vexatious Litigation Proceedings continue in Canyon County in CV - 2017 - 3444 which 
case number was changed from CV-2014-7409 after Judge DeMeyer signed an order referring 
the Vex. Lit. case after the Notice of Appeal was filed with the Supreme Court. 
Statement of Facts 
I. Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County 
(CV-2012-6404) against Ronald Van Hook on 07-02-2012 and was granted a temporary 
CPO, which was dismissed by the petitioner on 07-12-2012. 
2. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV 2014-
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6865) against Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on 07-01-2014 on behalf of the parties 
minor children, and was granted a temporary CPO. 
3. Ronald Van Hook filed 'Complaint for Custody, Visitation and Support' on 07-15-2014 
(CV-2014-7409), and then on 07-18-2014 filed 'Amended Complaint for a Decree of 
Legal Separation and for Custody of the Parties' Minor Children', which ran concurrently 
with the CPO (CV-2014-6865). The CPO case was never heard as Respondent could not 
be located, having fled with the children to places unknown, and was dismissed for lack 
of service by the court on 08-18-2014 after several continuances, but the Court stated the 
CPO could be refiled and republished. The case in CV-2014-7409 was properly served 
by publication by order of the Court and went into default. 
4. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV-2014-
8801) against Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on 08-25-2014 on behalf of the parties 
minor children, and the written petition was incomplete, and then petitioner stated to the 
court that the clerks office would not allow an attachment but that petitioner was to give 
it to the court once called, and petitioner also informed the court of an impairment that 
inhibited writing by hand, and asked if the court was going to review the allegations, to 
which the court answered no, and the petition was dismissed. 
5. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV-2014-
9041) against Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on behalf of the parties minor children, and 
the Court stated it would send a letter to the Department of Health and Welfare, but 
denied the petition. When the Court was asked by petitioner why a CPO had been 
granted earlier but not now, the Court answered that he wasn't the other judge. 
5 
6. Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Adams County 
(CV-2014-3311) against Ronald Van Hook on 09-04-2014, citing the same issues in her 
petition that had been previously dismissed in Canyon County case CV-2012-6404, and 
was granted a temporary CPO. On the hearing date of09-18-2014, Ms. Cannon never 
disclosed her address or a place where effective service could be made, and was without 
legal counsel. The Hearing date was reset for 10-02-2014, allowing the petitioner time to 
retain legal counsel. 
7. On 09-08-2014 case number CV-2014-7409 went into default, and at a default hearing on 
09-11-2014 petitioner was awarded sole legal custody of the parties' minor children. 
8. At a hearing for Adams County CV-2014-3311 on 10-02-2014, Petitioner, during direct 
examination, was asked what she was afraid of when she left Canyon County with the 
children, and she answered "Nothing". 
9. In Adams County CV-2014-3311 on 10-02-2014 the court ordered a CPS investigation, 
which was conducted by Ms. Krista Easteppe, which resulted in a report with 
recommendations that were submitted to the court. Ms. Easteppe, who by her own 
testified admission during examination on 10-27-2014, never contacted any of 
Respondents witnesses or considered any affidavits provided by Respondents witnesses 
during the investigation. 
10. In Adams County CV-2014-3311 it was testified to by multiple witnesses that there was 
"Law Enforcement" involvement who had direct contact with Ms. Cannon (fka Van 
Hook) during the time frame that the Canyon County CPO (CV-2014-6865) was 
effective and awaiting service, yet that CPO was never served. 
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11. In Adams County CV- 2014-3311, on 10-02-2014, presided over by Judge John 
Meienhoffer, the Court stated before issuing a temporary order, 
"I do not want the children around Lloyd and Karen Elderedge at this point. I 
have far too many concerns with that. He was placed on 5 years probation in the 
State of Oregon for inappropriate contact with a 15 year old girl. Renee is 
currently 14 years old. And there's allegations that Karen Elderedge was drinking 
daily while down at the trailer court, where Ms. Johnson said Karen Elderedge 
always had a beer in her hand. So there's to be no further contact with Karen and 
Lloyd Elderedge. That's going to be part of the Courts Order in allowing Mrs. 
Van Hook to continue to maintain the primary custody of the children pending 
our court date on the 27th." 
12. On 10-27-2014 a CPO was granted to Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) in Adams County 
CV-2014-3311, presided over by Judge John Meienhoffer, in opposition to and/or 
inconsistent with the order previously issued in Canyon County in CV-2014-7409. 
13. On 10-27-2014 in Adams County CV-2014-3311, During the Decision, The court 
specifically stated the CPO did not apply to the children as there was no evidence of any 
physical violence against them by Ronald Van Hook. The Court further stated in its 
order 
"The issues with regard to the Eldredges, and the allegations of sexual 
misconduct. And frankly counsel, those were addressed by my very direct and 
specific order, which is going to continue, that the three Van Hook children are to 
not have any contact with Mr. and Mrs. Eldredge. Mrs. Van Hook, you can have 
whatever contact you want with Mr. Eldredge and Mrs. Eldredge. Those kids are 
not to have any contact." 
14. On 10-27-2014 in Adams County CV-2014-3311, During the Decision, the Court stated 
"Now, this type of litigation Counsel -- Mr. Van Hook, Mrs. Van Hook -- This is 
not something that this Court should of had to deal with. This should have been 
litigated down in Caldwell in front of the Court that is going to be dealing with 
the divorce, the custody of the children, the separation and division of property, 
the ordering of evaluations, the ordering of an expert, potentially the order and 
potentially a brief focused assessment." 
15. On 10-27-2014 in Adams County CV-2014-3311, During the Decision, the Court stated 
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"Mr. Van Hook, I'm concerned about how it is that you're just randomly running 
into Mr. Eldredge. I'm also concerned about the fact that once you got the Child 
Protective Investigation Report you immediately contacted Mrs. Arp and 
challenged her. You went up to Mr. Manleys home and you, you addressed him 
directly. And while I do understand sir, I understand sir [ with emphasis] that you 
went two and a half months without seeing your children, and that's of concern. 
But I share Miss Easteppes concerns, about the way that you're handling this. I 
have no direct experience with this Mr. Van Hook and I, you know I don't know 
how a person in your situation should behave. You're upset; That's legitimate. 
You didn't see your kids for two and a half months; That's legitimate. You're 
angry; Also legitimate. I just, I don't know Mr. Van Hook, if you went too far. 
Ms. Easteppe thinks you did. I can tell you sir that there has been some concern 
about your roughness and your aggressiveness. I am going to just leave it at that 
with regard to the analysis of that portion." 
16. In Adams County, Ronald Van Hook, on his own, petitioned for a Civil Protection Order 
on behalf of the minor children, and the Court refused to hear it. 
17. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV-2014-
11708) on 11-14-2014 against Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) on behalf of the parties 
minor children. At the hearing the Court refused to include the children in a CPO, but 
offered a CPO between Mr. and Mrs. Van Hook, even though the petition specifically 
stated "Mother has threatened and attempted to kill sons, herself and me. Strikes 
Children. Contributes to delinquency (gives alcohol). Endangers children with exposure 
to the elements. Neglects children with unsanitary conditions", among other things. The 
Court dismissed the petition for CPO. 
18. On 10-24-2014 in Canyon County CV-2014-7409, Defendant filed 'Motion in Limine: 
Requesting Judicial Notice of Report of Child Protective Investigation. Steven Fisher, 
attorney for Plaintiff, failed to submit an objection. The Motion in Limine was granted 
on 10-29-2014. 
19. On 11-13-2014, Defendants Motion to Set aside Default in CV-2014-7409 was heard. 
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Steven Fisher, attorney for Plaintiff, failed to submit a timely objection. The Court, in its 
decision, stated "the Court is going to find that Plaintiff had knowledge of where the 
Defendant was at the time he applied for the default." The Order setting aside the default 
was issued 11-19-2014. 
20. On 03-23-2015, Defendant filed for an Ex-Parte Restraining order, which was granted on 
03-25-2015. On 04-03-2015, Appellant filed on his own, an Objection to the Ex-Parte 
Restraining Order. 
21. Ms. Mary Grant of Idaho Legal Aid, counsel for defendant in case CV-2014-7409, had 
filed a motion for temporary orders, which were to be effective between the dates of the 
expiration of the CPO in Adams County (CV-2014-3311) and the Trial in Canyon 
County (CV-2014-7409). Mr. Fisher, counsel for plaintiff, failed to submit any response 
to the Defendants Motions. At the hearing, on 04-04-2016, The court directly asked 
Defendants Counsel if the Temporary Orders were consistent with the Protection Order, 
and Ms. Grant answered Yes, while Mr. Fisher failed to offer any objection. Mr. Van 
Hook, who stood to object, was threatened with incarceration by the court. Temporary 
Orders, that were inconsistent with previous orders, were allowed by the court without 
any review of the previous orders, and Mr. Fisher was allowed leave from the case while 
the Plaintiff was not allowed to make any objections. Prior to this Hearing, Appellant. 
On his own, filed in Adams County for Contempt charges against Defendant. That 
hearing was presided over by Judge Meienhoffer, who dismissed the case stating it could 
be refiled in Canyon County, and changed the venue to Canyon County while considering 
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the pending case consolidation. 
22. On 05-18-2015, Defendant filed a Renewed Motion to Consolidate Cases, which 
consolidated Adams County CV-2014-3311 with Canyon County CV-2014-7409. On 
05-26-2015 the court ordered these cases consolidated. 
23. Ronald Van Hook, Plaintiff Pro Se, on 05-28-2015, filed Motions to Amend 
Consolidation of Cases, to Amend Temporary Orders for Custody and Visitation, 
Disqualification, and an Objection to the Ex-Parte Restraining Order. These were heard 
on 05-07-2015 and the Court instructed the Plaintiff to refile. The Motions were refiled 
with a notice of appearance pro-se by plaintiff, and then heard on 06-11-2015 in the 
Court presided over by Judge Gary DeMeyer. All motions were denied. 
24. On 07-07-2015, Plaintiff Pro Se filed a Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem. 
This matter was heard on 07-16-2015 and the Court required a $20,000 bond be posted 
by Plaintiff. Plaintiff informed the Court he could not post the bond and the Motion was 
then denied. 
25. On 08-03-2015, during the trial, Judge Gary DeMeyer, presiding, refused to allow any of 
consolidated case to be considered in the trial. The oral exchange between the Plaintiff 
and the Court as follows: 
COURT: I don't care what happened in the Protection Order. This is my case. 
I'm trying it, and I'm hearing it. So, I'm sustaining the objection. 
Mr. Van Hook: Is there still the testimony that was offered still in this case 
though? The previous testimonies that were given. 
COURT: It's an all brand new ball game at this point in time. 
Mr. Van Hook: I'm failing to understand then why we cannot allow the testimony 
of people if it was already offered at the CPU. 
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COURT: I'm not considering it. 
26. On 08-03-2015, during the trial, Judge Gary DeMeyer, presiding, refused to allow 
Ms.Tiffany Warren to testify, per the oral exchange in the Court as follows: 
COURT: I think you'd have to call Tiffany Warren. I don't think I can---- as 
such without her being here. 
Mr. Van Hook: She is here in the hall way sir. 
COURT: Well, do you want to call her then? 
MS. Stretch: Well we object, she's not on the list. 
COURT: Oh she's not on the list? 
Ms. Stretch: She's not on the July 6th witness list. She's on the July 30th one but 
not the July 6th one. So she's on the one you already dismissed. 
Mr. Van Hook: Again, these are text messages I just became aware of about a 
week ago. 
COURT: All right I'm going to sustain the objection. 
27. On 08-07-2015, in the Courts Decision, Counsel for the Defendant, Kimberly Stretch of 
Idaho Legal Aid, was instructed by the Court to write the order and submit it directly to 
the Court without any review or approval from the Plaintiff. This Order that was 
submitted was inconsistent with the order the Court gave, but was signed by the court 
anyway, and the written order is tantamount to a termination of parental rights. 
28. All issues that were decided by the Court in CV-2014-7409 at the Default Hearing on 09-
11-2014 to be true and correct are issues that were later testified to in Adams County CV-
2014-3311 (CPO) and Canyon County CV-2014-7409 (trial), and the Defendant offered 
no refuting evidence or testimony nor provided any witnesses to refute those same issues, 
and the Decision of the trial court omitted each of those issues from its decision, and 
those issues are quoted from the Plaintiff in the Default Hearing as follows: 
"My wife's threatened to kill my kids. She doesn't take care of them. They live 
in squalor. She does not tend to my kids. She lets other people smack my kids 
around. She smacks my kids around. She's gotten my daughter drunk on several 
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occasions. My daughter is 13 years old. She ran off with a convicted sex 
offender from the State of Oregon. That's been expunged but from a Private 
Investigators Report, He's a sexual criminal, that's who she's in the presence of." 
29. On Sept. 11, 2015, an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order was filed in the 
District Court of Owyhee County, presided over by Judge Grober, by the Plaintiff Ronald 
Van Hook against Defendants Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook), Lloyd Elderedge and 
Karen Elderedge, Supported by the affidavit of plaintiff, together with a Motion for Fee 
Waiver supported by an Affidavit pertaining to Fee Waiver. On Sept. 11, 2015, the 
Plaintiffs Motion for fee waiver was approved. On Sept. 11, 2015, the Plaintiffs Motion 
for Ex Parte restraining Order was denied without a hearing. 
30. Plaintiff/Appellant retained the services of Attorney Virginia Bond on 09-12-2015. Ms. 
Bond filed a Notice of Appearance in Canyon County Case CV-2014-7409 on 09-23-
2015, and on the same day filed Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration. 
On 11-17-2015, Ms. Bond filed a Notice of Hearing for a hearing on 01-14-2016. Before 
the Hearing for the Motions for New Trial and Reconsideration, Ms. Bond filed Motion 
to withdraw Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration on 12-22-2015 
without an affidavit from the Plaintiff/Appellant. On 12-24-2016, the Court entered an 
Order to Withdraw Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration and Vacate 
Hearing. Ms. Bond then filed a Motion to Change Venue, with an affidavit from 
Plaintiff/Appellant on 12-30-2015. A Notice of Hearing was filed on 01-14-2016 for 
hearing on 01-28-2016, and at that Hearing, presided over by Judge Gary DeMeyer, the 
Court Dismissed the Motion to Change Venue. Ms. Bond next filed a Motion to 
withdraw as attorney of record and Notice of Hearing on 03-08-2016 for a hearing date of 
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03-17-2016, Presided over by Judge William B. Dillon, who granted Ms. Bonds Motion, 
and the Court Notes do not reflect that Plaintiff/Appellant filed an affidavit in 
conjunction with his Objection to Ms. Bonds Motion to withdraw as attorney of record, 
while Ms. Kimberly Stretch, attorney for Defendant/Respondent, when asked by the 
Court if she wanted to review the Affidavit of Plaintiff/Appellant, stated she didn't care 
what was in the affidavit, she had no objection to Ms. Bond withdrawing as attorney for 
plaintiff/appellant. 
Introductory Arguments: 
Pro Se litigants Court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent 
standards than submissions of lawyers. If the Court can reasonably read the submissions, it 
should do so, despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor 
syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule requirements. (Boag v. 
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 
S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d ,80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30, L.Ed.2d 652 
(1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding prose petition cannot be held to same standard as 
pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422,429 (D.N.J. 1999). 
The Idaho State Constitution Article 1, Section 3, cites the US Constitution as being the 
SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2 (The Supremacy 
Clause) provides that the U.S. Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it and treaties made 
under its authority, constitute the supreme law of the land. It provides that State Courts are 
bound by the supreme law; in case of conflict between federal and state law, the federal law must 
be applied. Even State Constitutions are subordinate to Federal Law. 
This case, and cases pertaining to this case, have been going on since 2012. The 
statement of facts provided are merely a starting point, or highlights of the facts, and certainly do 
not in any way reflect all of the facts in this case and other cases pertaining to this case. It is 
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important that all cases pertaining to this case be viewed and/or considered, as they are of the 
same subject matter, or they have a direct link to the subject matter at hand. The cases with 
linking or same subject matter contain, as asserted by appellant, demonstrations of how the 
Respondent, certain State Actors, and certain Non-State Actors have abused and/or used the 
Courts as 'stepping stones' to arrive at unlawful conclusions, decisions and orders. 
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, 
he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 
F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud 
which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the 
parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury ... it is where the court 
or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the 
judge has not performed his judicial function - thus where the impartial functions 
of the court have been directly corrupted." 
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to 
"embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, 
or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can 
not perform in the usual mannerist impartial task of adjudging cases that are 
presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's 
Federal Practice, 2d ed., p.512. A 'I[ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a 
decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and 
never becomes final." 
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 
1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 
1954). 
Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court requesting Judicial Notice be taken of certain 
cases "Directly Associated With and/or of the same, similar, or associated subject matter as the 
case currently pending on appeal" on July 12, 2017, and that Request was denied Aug. 7, 2017. 
Appellant, after reviewing the Court Record provided by Canyon County, prior to it 
being sent up to the Supreme Court, objected to the contents of that record as being incomplete. 
This objection was filed with the District Court on 07-10-2017 and went without objection or 
response from the Respondent. That being the case, the District Court Augmented the cases it 
had jurisdiction to Augment on 07-18-2017. From the Appellants list of cases to Augment, 3 of 
them are not from Canyon County. CV-2014-3311 was from Adams County, but was already 
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consolidated with CV-2014-7409 in Canyon County. The other cases not from Canyon County 
are CV-2014-0678 in Owyhee County, and CV-2017-3444 from Adams County, both of which 
were collateral attacks on what Appellant asserts to be illegal orders and illegal proceedings 
conducted in Canyon County. All other cases being from Canyon County, the District Courts 
Augmentation should apply and should be therefore considered by the Supreme Court. 
Kimberly Stretch filed to have Appellant held as a Vexatious Litigant, and there was a 
hearing before Judge Ford on February 14, 2017, regarding vexatious litigation, where Kimberly 
Stretch, counsel for Respondent, presented to the Court a copy of Appellants Court submissions 
she claimed to be vexatious. Appellant responded during this hearing and presented to that Court 
documents submitted to a court to Make Ms. Stretchs compilation of documents more complete. 
Furthermore, Appellant submitted to that court a 'Flash Drive' with copies of most all court 
submissions to various court proceedings and audios of Court Hearings, and both the documents 
and the flash drive were admitted and labeled as exhibits accepted by the Court. During this 
hearing, Judge Ford stated he would have his decision in 30 days. As. this was all done under 
Case CV-2014-7409, every bit of the information provided to that Court are part of this case and 
must be considered by the Supreme Court. 
CV-2014-7409 continued, even after Appellant filed the Notice of Appeal to the Supreme 
Court, when Magistrate Judge Gary DeMeyer signed an order referring the Appellant for 
Vexatious Litigant proceedings ... which had already been heard, as previously mentioned, on 
Feb. 14, 2014. Judge Ford changed the case number to CV-2017-3444, however, again as 
previously stated, all the evidence Kimberly Stretch presented to that Court, had originally been 
presented when the case was CV-2014-7409. The sudden change of case numbers, and the 
timing of this litigation (while the matter was already pending before the Supreme Court) 
certainly has the appearance of an attempt to keep these matters from being viewable by the 
Supreme Court in this Appeal. However, the Supreme Court must view and consider this as it 
was a part of CV-2014-7409 when these exhibits were submitted, and these exhibits pull in all 
cases that Kimberly Stretch submitted documentation for, and that Appellant submitted as 
exhibits as well. The cases involved in the vexatious litigation proceedings under CV-2014-
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7409, cases consolidated and cases augmented include the following: Canyon County CV-2012-
6404, CV-2014-6865, CV-2014-7409, CV-2014-8801, CV-2014-9041, CV-2014-11708, CV-
2016-5044 and CV-2016-11807. Adams County CV-2014-3311 and CV-2017-3664. Owyhee 
County CV-2015-0678. And finally another Canyon County Case, CV-2017-3444, which is the 
Vexatious Litigant Proceedings originally filed as CV-2014-7409, and then further pursued 
under the order of Gary DeMeyer, even after this appeal to the Supreme Court was noticed. 
After the cases were ordered Augmented, Appellant paid all required fees, and then the 
record was sent to the Supreme Court without allowing appellant the time necessary to review 
the record for completeness. Appellant asserts the record that was sent to the Supreme Court is 
incomplete, and Appellant further claims this to be the cause of a Grieved Status and requests 
redress in the form of a Writ of Creatorai ordering the presentation of all documents pertaining to 
this case be submitted to this Court for review. Justice Demands the Appearance of Justice 
(Previously cited in Levine v. United States), and the fact that pertinent documents that are 
necessary for justice are missing from the record fails to give this the appearance of Justice. 
A few examples of missing documents are as follows: 
CV-2014-3311 from Adams County, and all associated documents, are completely 
missing. This was consolidated with CV-2014-7409 and must be available for this courts review 
and/or reference. Prior to the trial in CV-2014-7409, appellant had requested discovery in the 
production of Health and Welfare records ( cite page number in record) This was ordered be 
provided to the Appellant, but never was, and remains missing from the record. The submissions 
made to the District Court on appeal, before this appeal to the Supreme Court, are incomplete as 
the Transcript for the Hearing before the District Court on the appellants first appeal to the 
District Court is missing. This transcript was originally in the record, but the Appellant objected 
to the record being incomplete. The record was ordered Augmented with the missing documents 
that the District Court had jurisdiction over, and some of those documents were added to the 
record in the amended record that was sent to the Supreme Court, but now the aforementioned 
Transcript is no longer part of the record. (cite date filed). Another document requested in the 
Objection to the Record was from the evidence presented to the Magistrate Court during the trial; 
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that being copies of the children's report cards, front and back. (Front side AND Back side ... as 
this will clearly demonstrate evidence has been 'Altered' when the document currently in the 
record does not match the document that accurately described during the trial). Also missing are 
the Objections to the Motions filed by Respondent in 2015 while Steven Fisher was attorney for 
the appellant, or the specific notation on the record that these documents do not exist. Also 
missing is the "Sealed Envelope" providing Department of Health and Welfare Records per 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, response signed by Brent King and filed on July 23, 2015 (Rec. 294-
295) and then disclosure was ordered July 27, 2015 (Rec. 309-310). Also missing is any 
notation by the Court that there is NOT an Affidavit from the Appellant that allowed Virginia 
Bond to dismiss the Motions for and Reconsideration and Retrial on Dec. 22, 2015. 
Documents, such as the ones listed that are missing, but not necessarily limited to those 
listed, are necessary to the Appellant in this appeal, for the Motion under IRCP 60 that this Court 
must allow to come to fruition, for demonstrating the need for the Disqualification of Gary 
DeMeyer from this case, for demonstrating malfeasance on the part of numerous attorneys in this 
case, for future complaints and/or court actions for civil rights violations, etc. These missing 
documents and whether or not they are considered in this appeal, are certainly up to the 
discretion of this court ... Regardless, their absence from the record gives the appearance of 
something amiss, and is cause for a grievance by the Appellant, which is why the appellant 
requests a writ of Certiorari. 
Preface to issues currently on appeal: 
Appellant requests the Court fully review the Order that was written with the Order that 
was given by the Court on 08-27-2015. Appellant further requests review of the audio record to 
demonstrate the method in which the Order was written. Kimberly Stretch, Counsel for the 
Respondent, and by specific order from the Court in CV-2014-7409, wrote the order after the 
court relayed its decision, and was further ordered to write this order without any assistance or 
approval from the Appellant before submitting it directly to the Court. Judge DeMeyer then 
signed the order Ms. Stretch had prepared, (filed with the court on 09-09-2015 and signed by 
Judge DeMeyer on 09-11-2015) and that order written is inconsistent with the Order that was 
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actually given and is tantamount to the termination of the parental rights of the Appellant. There 
are absolutely no parental rights that appellant has the ability to exercise. There is absolutely no 
guaranteed right to any communication with my children whatsoever. There is however a 
requirement to pay child support, which appellant pays, ultimately under the threat of being held 
in contempt and being subjected to penalties associated with contempt if the order is not 
followed. Furthermore; the Respondent agreed to certain divisions of property and the 
payment/settlement of debts which still have yet to be satisfied. 
As detailed in the statement of facts, Appellant next filed for a Restraining Order, in 
Appellants County of Residence, Owyhee County, and this was denied by that Court. The 
parties listed in the Restraining Order were Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook), Lloyd Elderedge, and 
Karen Elderedge. Judge DeMeyer, in the Trial made it very clear that the Elderedges were not a 
party to the action, and further made it clear, contrary to the claims of Counsel for the 
Respondent, that he was not going to consider anything from the CPO in Adams County, which 
had been consolidated with the case in Canyon County- CV-2014-3311 consolidated with CV-
2014-7409 in Canyon County. With this in mind, Appellant filed for the restraining order using 
only issues that were not allowed, or hadn't been decided in the trial. Furthermore, as detailed in 
the Statement of Facts, Lloyd and Karen Elderedge were to be allowed to have no contact 
whatsoever with the minor children of the Appellant and the Respondent when there was an 
existing order in Adams County. Furthermore, as detailed in the statement of facts, that order 
from the court in Adams County was to be consistent with the new temporary orders in Canyon 
County. Furthermore, Appellant asserts that both counsel for the Respondent and Counsel for 
the Appellant committed a fraud on the Court when Respondents Counsel affirmed that the new 
orders were consistent with the previous orders, and Appellants Counsel offered no objections. 
Furthermore, Appellant asserts that Judge Gary DeMeyer violated Due Process and failed to 
guarantee Equal Protection when he failed to allow Appellant any opportunity to offer any 
objections and threatened Appellant with incarceration for standing up to object. Furthermore, 
Appellant asserts Judge Gary DeMeyer continued to violate the Appellants right to due process 
and equal protection when he failed to change the orders to an appropriate order after Appellant 
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filed a Motion to amend orders after having filed his notice of appearance. ( again, this is just the 
tip of the iceberg. This in no way reflects every single action by the court and/or officers of the 
court, for which Appellant has a grievance) 
As detailed in the statement of facts, Appellant retained Ms. Virginia Bond as counsel, 
and ultimately Ms. Bond was given leave from the case. Appellant claims a grieved status for 
many issues that occurred between the time that Ms. Bond was retained as counsel for the 
Appellant and the time Ms. Bond was allowed leave from the case. Appellant is aggrieved that 
Ms. Bond never appealed the decision of the trial court through very deceptive means and 
excuses. Appellant is aggrieved by the excessive amount of time between the filing of Motions 
for a Retrial and for Reconsideration, and the time it took to set hearings on those motions. 
Appellant is aggrieved by the Objections to these motions filed by Respondent in that they are 
full of untruthful statements to which appellant asserts amounts to perjury, and that those issues 
were shown to Ms. Bond and demonstrated as being untruthful on the part of the Respondent by 
way of actual audio recordings from the trial and earlier CPO in Adams County. Appellant is 
aggrieved that Ms. Bond deceptively dismissed the Appellants Motions without the approval of 
the Appellant. Appellant is aggrieved that the Court in CV-2014-7409, presided over by Judge 
DeMeyer, Ordered the Motions Dismissed in the absence of an Affidavit by the Appellant. 
Appellant is aggrieved that the venue of the case was not changed as required by (insert ref.). 
Appellant is aggrieved that Ms. Bond was allowed leave from the case while Ms. Stretch directly 
told the Court she didn't care what was in the Appellants affidavit. (ref transcript) Appellant is 
aggrieved that the Court Notes from Ms. Bonds motion to take leave from the case, do not reflect 
Appellant filed an affidavit, and Appellant further asserts that the affidavit filed by the appellant 
in objection to Ms. Bond being allowed to take leave from the case, clearly shows malfeasance 
on the part of Ms. Virginia Bond. (ref. all motions) (Ref. Objections to motions) (ref. 
affidavit.)(ref. Transcript) 
Appellant, after having long since lost all faith and Confidence in the ability of Judge 
Gary DeMeyer to guarantee fundamentally fair proceedings, Appellant field a Motion to Recuse 
Judge Gary DeMeyer with Cause for Bias. As the record will show, this motion was denied after 
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counsel for respondent argued 'there was nothing pending to recuse the judge from' and declared 
frivolous. 
Appellant appealed the Magistrate Courts Decision to the District Court, and that appeal 
was presided over by District Court Judge Duff McKee (hereinafter, "!st appeal") 
The I st appeal was noticed, briefed and went to hearing. The Court made it very clear 
that there was nothing pending before the magistrate court to actually recuse Judge DeMeyer for. 
COURT: There's no basis for the appeal because there is no matter pending upon 
which the judge is being called upon to act and from which he can be recused 
from acting. (T. Pg47 L15-18) 
Appellant argued the term "at any time" is self-evident, regarding when a judge can be 
disqualified with cause, but the court disagreed. Appellant asserts there was also something 
pending at the time the Motion for Change of Venue was heard and dismissed, where a change of 
venue was required, per IRFLP 105 A, 502A and IRCP 40.1 (2), as the Court specifically said: 
COURT: You haven't reached an agreement, but you're attempting to reach 
some sort of 
Ms. Bond: Right. 
Ms. Stretch: We're attempting to reach an agreement, yes. 
COURT: Okay. So I'll just simply put this on hold until I hear back from either 
one or both of you that we're proceeding forward with this case. (Transcript form 
Motion Hearing on Jan. 28, 2016, P4, LI0-19) 
Regardless of the outcome of that 1st appeal, appellant believed it to be in his best 
interest (considering the time it takes for appeals to come to fruition before the Supreme Court) 
to follow the Courts Advise, that was given directly to the Appellant by presiding Judge Duff 
McKee. 
COURT: "You take a deep breath, and you step back, and you file the 
appropriate motion. And if it's a material mistake, if it's something that is 
material to the cause, it can be corrected." (T pg 11 L18-21) 
Appellant continued in arguments that were never denied by Respondent or ruled upon 
by the Court as follows: 
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Mr. Van Hook: "My parental rights have been terminated. And I know 
somebody may tum around and say that, Oh, no, you've got this in the order. 
What has happened is tantamount to a termination of parental rights. And by 
whatever title, by whatever name anybody wants to get it, I have no rights as a 
parent. And there is not one shred of evidence against me in the trial. It is all 
against my ex-wife. But the judge -Judge DeMeyer just completely flipped the 
whole thing around, and that is why I got a new attorney. And I did get the new 
attorney who did promise me the moon. And then it came right down to it, 
committed forgery, got rid of the case, and now there's not a single thing I can do. 
The only step I can take is to have the judge recused with cause." (T pg 12 LS-20) 
The Court was specifically asked about the limits of what the court had the ability to do, 
and Appellant asserts the courts answer was vague, as it failed to answer the question. 
Van Hook: "Am I to understand, Judge, that the only authority this court has is to 
either accept Judge DeMeyer's ruling or overrule it? Is that the only thing this 
courts going to be able to do? 
The Court: "Well, the only thing pending in front of me is Judge DeMeyer's 
Motion to Recuse or your Motion to Recuse Judge DeMeyer. But it comes at a 
time when there is nothing pending before Judge DeMeyer. The case is all over. 
Time is all expired. All the appeal time for the judgment is expired. The time for 
the Rule 60(b) Motion to Reconsider for Clerical Errors in the Judgment or 
Motion for Clarification under Rule 60(b) has expired. There are still some rights 
under 60, but they're down on - 60(c), (d), and (e) and whatnot - I don't want to 
get in there." (T pg14 LS-19) 
Per IRCP Rule 60 (d), Rule 60 does not limit a courts power to set aside a judgment for 
fraud on the Court. This rule is not limited to just the Magistrate Court, but also an authority 
held by the District Court. Rule 60 (a) specifically allows the Magistrate to correct errors on 
their own, by leave from the Appellate Court if an appeal is pending. Neither Gary DeMeyer of 
the Magistrate Court nor Judge McKee of the District Court made any corrections, and appellant 
asserts that in this failure to correct known 'Discrepancies' throughout this case, that Discretion 
was abused. More specifically, that Frauds on the Court were allowed to go unchecked. 
Judge McKee could have at least 'Investigated' allegations against officers of the 
Magistrate Court, as the District Court as that authority, whether or not it's brought by motion 
or not. Judge McKee demonstrated things were, at the very least, 'Amiss'. 
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COURT: "This would defy any graduate lawyer. You could probably write four 
of five bar review questions on what you folks have been through just all by 
yourself." (T Pg38 Ll4-17) 
Judge Meienhofer in Adams County was defiantly involved in all of this as the Court he 
presided over in Adams County CV-2014-3311 became consolidated with this case. Appellant 
asserts the Court in 3311 acted without jurisdiction over the Appellant, the children or the subject 
matter, as custody issues had already been ordered in CV-2014-7409, granting sole custody of 
the Children to the Appellant by default. Appellant asserts Judge McKee demonstrated a bias 
and abused discretion. 
COURT: "Meienhofer went in great lengths of this. I know John well. He's a 
good, good, young friend of mine. He started his practice in law with me. He 
started as my law clerk 15, 20 years ago. And he's going to be a fine judge. I'm 
following him along." (T Pg38 L20-25) 
COURT: "When John was in private practice, I used him personally when my 
grandson got his tail tied in a knot, and I took him down to see John to get it -
take care of it. Very practical. Very straight shooter. And I think very, very fair, 
a very fair person. Does the absolute best he can." (T Pg39 Ll-6) 
The Court specifically addresses whether or not Appellants complaints are frivolous. 
Mr. Van Hook: "So you' re telling me, Judge, that even though she has 
specifically written an order that the judge never gave that it's frivolous, that my 
complaints are frivolous?" 
COURT: "The motion to - no, your complaints are not frivolous. That's what 
I'm trying to tell you. But you've got them in the wrong forum." (T Pg42 L9-15) 
The Court specifically states that this is NOT JUSTICE 
COURT: "Well, also I think that what you need to do - this is really tough 
advice, but you need to go someplace and take a great big deep breath. Your kids 
are going to grow up. The kids are going to grow up. You said earlier, What do I 
do? Wait until they're 21? Well, maybe. You wouldn't be the first dad that 
didn't get to watch them grow up. 
Mr. Van Hook: "And where is the justice in that?" 
COURT: "There isn't. There isn't." (T Pg49 L8-16) 
The Court further shows that the Order written by Kimberli Stretch, by Order of the 
Court in the decision, is inconsistent with the Order the Court actually gave. Appellant asserts 
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this to demonstrate further that Kimberli Stretch and Judge DeMeyer, both have committed fraud 
on the court. 
COURT: Well, that order- that's in the order that it be by phone contact, that the 
visitation -
Mr. Van Hook: No, sir. She wrote in the order, "if the kids decide." 
COURT: If the kids decide. 
Mr. Van Hook: That is not what the judge ordered. He said phone contact was to 
remain the same as it is in the previous order. 
COURT: It's in there. 
Mr. Van Hook: And it gave me unrestricted phone contact between the hours of 
8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday, no restrictions. 
COURT: Well, it's not that specific, but phone contact at any time is in the final 
judgment. 
Mr. Van Hook: No, sir, it's not. She put in there, "if the kids decide" 
COURT: Well, they got to answer the phone. 
Mr. Van Hook: Sir, phone contact means I pick up the phone; I make the call; 
somebody answers the phone. Without that there is no contact. I can call my 
kids right now. They're not going to answer the phone. The phone is off the 
hook. (T.P44 Ll-23) 
Again, Judge McKee demonstrates the Courts knowledge of fundamental flaws in the Order. 
Mr. Van Hook: My argument is, Judge, that is not a parental right at that point. 
That is a parental decision that the other parent gets to make to dictate to me when 
I can see my own kids. 
COURT: Well -
Mr. Van Hook: Because ultimately, Judge, the proof is in the pudding. The proof 
is in how things have turned out. 
COURT: That's right. That's right. This is what - I'm just going to suggest to 
you on this thing is the struggle on this is whether this is a matter of the manner in 
which the order was written or the manner in which the order is being carried out. 
If it's a matter in which the order is written, that's one thing - I mean as to how 
that thing gets fixed, by modification or by some proceedings or reopen the thing 
to clarify or to change the manner in which the order is written. If it's the manner 
in which the order is carried out, that's a separate matter. But that's the old matter 
of how the thing is to be enforced. Neither one of those things have anything to 
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do with whether or not DeMeyer is showing any impartiality or bias. That's my 
struggle with this. 
Mr. Van Hook: He signed the order in opposition to what he gave. He gave the 
order sitting behind the bench, told her to write - told Ms. Stretch to write the 
order herself, that I could not have any part in playing to it, to submit that order 
directly to the court. And the order she submitted to the court, to Judge DeMeyer, 
is not the order that he gave. (T Pg46 L2-25 & Pg47 Ll-7) 
The following is from the Transcript from the Motion Hearing on April 21, 2016 (Filed 
May 11, 2016) (Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause) See Exhibits File pages 38-45 
Miss Stretch: when I say that I have seen unrelenting disrespect for the Court and 
for the legal process, I have seen that since the summer of 2014 because I was 
part of this. Whether I signed on in July or not, I've been part of this and have 
had direct knowledge of all of this. (T. pg.13 Ll-6) 
Appellant firmly requests the Court review the audio record and require Ms. Stretch to 
demonstrate EXACTLY where this "Unrelenting Disrespect for the Court" is that Ms. Stretch 
has claimed was done by Appellant. When Ms. Stretch is unable to demonstrate this, then 
Appellant asserts this to be a Fraud on the Court. On another occasion, Ms. Stretch claimed the 
Appellant had an 'Outburst' in court, which is why Judge DeMeyer had threatened incarceration 
of the appellant. Appellant has denied this before and denies it again, and absolutely insists the 
Court Audio Record be reviewed, and Ms. Stretch should be obligated to show exactly where 
this 'Outburst' is that she claims to have knowledge of. Judge McKee referenced an 'Affidavit' 
being adequate, and that Ms. Stretch could write attesting to this, which sounds a lot like hearsay 
to the Appellant, and Hearsay is not fact. Appellant also asserts that this gives the appearance of 
the Court attempting to assist Ms. Stretch in covering up a fraud on the court, which would be an 
abuse of discretion and erroneous. 
THE COURT: Well, the standpoint of an affidavit is probably adequate for her to say on 
information and belief because Ms. Grant told her that Ms. Grant was present when there 
was an outburst. She goes back and tells Ms. Stretch, and Ms. Stretch puts it in the 
affidavit. (T Pg27 L 11-16) 
Ms. Stretch continued 
Miss Stretch: Concerning writing the decree, of course the Court knows this, and I 
assume Mr. Vanhook does not know. Under the new family law rules, any final 
decree order, that kind of thing needs to get approval by the other side. Under the 
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IRCPs it does not. So in asking you, do you want me to run this by Mr. Vanhook, 
it was simply, do you want to follow the rules as written, or do we want to - you 
know, we want to go with the family law rules, the case is under the old rules, not 
the new ones. I believe the Court chose to go with those. (T. pg.13 L7-18) 
Whether it's the 'Old Rules' or the 'New Rules' ... Appellant asserts there is NO RULE 
that allows the Court to give an order, allow only one of the parties to write the order and not 
have any input from the other party before submitting it to the Court and having it signed and 
enforced when it is inconsistent with the Order that was given. No such rule exists, and 
Appellant asserts this to be a Fraud on the Court by Ms. Stretch. 
Miss Stretch: And whether Mr. Vanhook is aware of it or not - or I guess 
he is not - I did object during the trial to having the CPO testimony come in again 
and other witnesses that weren't even on the witness list come in. And you 
overruled me. And I know that running through my head was, like, oh crap, now 
I'm going to have to deal with all this. I wasn't - you know, that I- kind of on 
the fly because this was not something that I thought should have come in. But 
you overruled me and allowed this stuff to come in. 
I don't believe Mr. Vanhook understood that you overruled me. He chose 
not to introduce CPO testimony. He chose not to have his girlfriend's daughter 
testify about his daughter. There are a number of things that you overruled me on 
that he chose not to - not to actually pursue. That's got nothing to do with me. 
Nor does that have anything to do with the Court. And it - so it's not a showing 
of bias. If anything - I mean, if I wanted to make the argument that - you know, 
that you were against me, not that it is, you know, I mean, there was just - he, 
obviously does not know certain things not being an attorney. But there's a 
number of things I objected to that you overruled me on and he chose not to 
follow the opening that you had given him. (T. pg.14 L3-25, pgl5. Ll-4) 
From the Audio Record for the Trial in CV-2014-7409 on Aug. 03, 2015. These Oral 
Exchanges between Ms. Bond, the Court and Mr. Van Hook are directly inconsistent with Ms. 
Bonds Claims. Appellant asserts this to be a demonstration of Frauds on the Court. 
Ms. Stretch: Again, Relevance 
COURT: Sustained 
Mr. Van Hook: Judge at the, in the Protection Order 
COURT: I don't care what happened in the Protection Order. This is my case. 
I'm trying it, and I'm hearing it. So, I'm sustaining objection. 
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Mr. Van Hook: Is there still the testimony that was offered still in this case 
though? The previous testimonies that were given. 
COURT: It's an all brand new ball game at this point in time. 
Mr. Van Hook: I'm failing to understand then why we cannot allow the testimony 
of people if it was already offered at the CPU. 
COURT: I'm not considering it. 
***** 
COURT: I think you'd have to call Tiffany Warren. I don't think I can---- as 
such without her being here. 
Mr. Van Hook: She is here in the hall way sir. 
Court: Well, do you want to call her then? 
Ms. Stretch: Well we object, she's not on the list. 
Court: Oh she's not on the list? 
Ms. Stretch: She's not on the July 6th witness list. She's on the July 30th one but 
not the July 6th one. So she's on the one you already dismissed. 
Mr. Van Hook: Again, these are text messages I just became aware of about a 
week ago. 
Court: All right I'm going to sustain the objection. 
Returning to Transcript from the Motion Hearing on April 21, 2016 (Filed May 11, 2016) 
(Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause) See Exhibits File pages 38-45 
Miss Stretch: The simple truth is, If Mr. Vanhook chose to actually take a look in 
the mirror and try to make himself a better father, his kids would want to see him. 
Again, the fact that his kids don't want to communicate with him has nothing to 
do with me, nor does that have anything to do with this Court. He's got- he's got 
time to speak to them on the phone, and he can visit them if they want. But they 
still - because his behavior has not changed, they have no desire to see him. 
Again, nothing to do with me, nor to do with this Court. It's strictly Mr. Vanhook 
and his - his parenting skills. (T. pg 15 Ll8-25, pg 16 Ll-5) 
This is directly inconsistent with the Written Order. The Appellant has Absolutely No 
Parental Rights he can exercise. Appellant again requests the court fully review the Courts Order 
on Audio and compare it to the Written Order that the Appellant was not allowed any 
participation in writing or any agreement to its correctness before it was signed by the Court and 
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then enforced. 
After Appellant addressed the Court, Ms. Bond, attorney for Respondent addressed the 
Court. Appellant tried to make the Court aware of the inconsistencies with Ms. Bonds 
arguments when she finished, but was not allowed to make them. Appellant asserts the 
following demonstrates Gary DeMeyers violation of the Appelants right to Due Process, and 
furthers what appellant asserts to be the appearance of conspiracy to prevent the truth from being 
told. 
Mr. Vanhook: I do have rebuttal for some of that, Judge. 
The Court: No, I'm not anymore. You've had your time, Mr. Vanhook. 
Mr. Vanhook: Some of her stuff was just absolutely false. 
The Court: So Mr. Vanhook, I'm going to deny your motion. I find this motion 
to be frivolous, without cause, and I'm going to award them their attorneys fees 
and costs for having to defend it. 
Appellant filed another Appeal with the District Court (hereinafter the '2nd Appeal') 
Appellant asserts there were frauds on the Court and Violations of Due Process in the Magistrate 
Court, and the Decision in the Magistrate Court was an 'Abuse of Discretion', and that Gary 
DeMeyer is absent of all jurisdiction in CV-2014-7409 .. 
Further Arguments are made that are supported directly by the Transcript of the Hearing 
held on Dec. 8, 2016 and filed Dec. 14, 2016 
Gary DeMeyer was obliged to do nothing on this case before hearing and deciding the 
Motion to disqualify with cause. Yet Gary DeMeyer did not comply with the requirement of 
IRCP Rule 40. 
Kimberly Stretch continues to say the phone calls to the children are at the Kids 
Discretion, when that was not the order given by the Court at the Decision after the trial. This, 
appellant asserts, is a direct misrepresentation of a material fact, and therefore a Fraud on the 
Court. 
Gary DeMeyer attempted to claim the Motion to Disqualify wasn't noticed for Hearing, 
and a review of the record will demonstrate that is untrue. 
Gary DeMeyer was directly cited or a defendant in a Motion for Writ of Mandamus, and 
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a Civil Complaint for Damages, and therefore a bias existed. 
Gary DeMeyer refused to allow timely objections to be made, and did so threatening 
Appellant with incarceration. 
Ms. Stretch denied having been served with the Appellants Civil Complaint for Damages 
where she was cited as a Defendant, which is an absolutely False Statement, as she had been 
served prior to this hearing. 
Ms. Stretch referred to pending Motions before the District Court as trying to orchestrate 
a Bias, and Judge DeMeyer ruled as such. 
In the 2nd Appeal to the District Court, In the Respondents Brief, filed with the Court on 
Feb. 27, 2017, on page 8, Ms. Stretch states as follows: 
" 'Stretch' objected to the four (4) new witnesses on Van Hook's July 30, 2015 
Witness List for not being disclosed in a timely manner. The objection was 
sustained, and those four (4) persons were to be prohibited from testifying. 
However, when Van Hook tried to call one, and Stretch renewed her Objection, it 
was overruled, and Van Hook was allowed to call a newly disclosed witness. For 
reasons unknown, he did not call that witness, however. Stretch also objected to 
the introduction of all evidence from the Adams County CPO hearing as an 
attempt to re-litigate the CPO hearing, and was again overreuled. But again for 
reasons unknown, Van Hook chose not to question his witnesses about the issues 
that arose in the Adams County CPO case." 
Appellant asserts that this statement by Ms. Stretch on her Respondents Brief, is a 
continuing Fraud On The Court, dealing with the same fraud earlier mentioned, just with a new 
phraseology. The witnesses name is Ms. Tiffany Warren. Ms. Warren is the only witness during 
the trial that any issue was raised on ... so this will prevent Ms. Stretch from claiming there was 
some misunderstanding and that she may have been speaking of some other witness that was 
objected to. And Again, the Audio Record for the Trial in CV-2014-7409, very clearly shows in 
plain spoken English, that Ms. Tiffany Warren being called as a witness by Appellant was 
objected to by the Respondent, and the Court very clearly Sustained the Respondents objection, 
and the witness was not allowed. Furthermore; the Audio Record clearly shows that Judge 
DeMeyer ruled on the day of the trial, that he would not allow anything from the Adams County 
CPO, which had been consolidated with CV-2014-7409, to be admitted in the trial, and 
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specifically stated the Court would not consider it. Appellant went into the trial with the rightful 
belief that the cases had been consolidated, and therefore did not have any need to call witnesses 
that had previously testified. The Court made the decision, while the trial was underway, that 
nothing from the Adams County CPO would be considered. Again, the record must be reviewed 
as it clearly demonstrates that Ms. Kimberly Stretch is misrepresenting a Material Fact, and 
appellant asserts that to be a Blatant Fraud on the Court. 
The Fact that the Court, presided over by Gary DeMeyer, refused to allow any testimony 
and/or evidence, that had been presented in Adams County CV-2014-3311 which was 
consolidated with Canyon County CV-2014-7409, clearly demonstrates the epitome of what is 
defined by "Natural Resources. v. U.S., 966 F. 2dl292, 97, (9th Cir.'92). A clear error of 
judgment; an action not based upon consideration of relevant factors and so is arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law or if it was taken 
without observance of procedure required by law,"; which is not to ever say this is the only 
grievance against Gary DeMeyer during the proceedings in question. The grievances Appellant 
has against Gary DeMeyer and attorneys ( officers of the Court) involved, would take volumes 
and volumes to completely demonstrate and argue; and Appellant has no doubt that when both 
cases are finally heard together, that any reasonable and prudent person would conclude these 
things don't come anywhere close to satisfying then appearance of justice. 
On page 9 of the 2nd Appeal to the District Court, In the Respondents Brief, it states, 
"Cannon lodged Objections to both motions", which is in reference to the Appellants Motions 
for Reconsideration and Retrial that were withdrawn by Ms. Virginia Bond, Counsel for 
Appellant at the time, but withdrawn while in the absence of any affidavit by Appellant. These 
Objections filed by Respondent are a violation of the doctrine of Estoppel, and Appellant will 
clearly demonstrate this beyond doubt, in the Hearing under IRCP Rule 60 that must inevitably 
occur, when comparing testimonies and rulings between the Adams County CPO and the Canyon 
County trial. (Appellants Brief filed Jan. 30, 2017 (Record pages 1248 - 1265)) 
The 'Previous Appeal' (the 1st appeal) was cited in the 2nd appeal, in the 'Statement of 
Facts', where it was stated, "All facts, issues and/or arguments listed and/or detailed in the 
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previous appeal are now cited and made part of this new appeal. In addition to those things in 
the previous appeal, new issues are raised in this Appeal and further arguments are made herein." 
"Did the Magistrate Court err in failing to identify and redress fraud upon the court 
whereby Judge DeMeyer demonstrated bias and/or favoritism toward the Respondent?" 
As the District Court of Appeals (in the first appeal) clearly stated the Appellants 
complaints were NOT frivolous, and that there was NOT JUSTICE in the case, and that the 
Appellant was correct in asserting that his parental rights had been terminated without cause, the 
Magistrate Court abused its discretion in denying all motions, and the District Court abused its 
discretion in failing to overturn the Magistrate Courts decision. 
This abuse of discretion is even further clarified in the fact that Judge McKee, in the first 
appeal, directly told the appellant there were remedies under Rule 60, and that appellant needed 
to file them in the right order 
THE COURT: Had there been a pending motion for a Rule 60, and there was a Motion 
to Recuse, now you would have them in the right order, but you don't have them in the right 
order here. You have the Motion to Recuse, and there's nothing pending. There's no action 
pending. If you had filed the Motion to Reopen or a Motion to Reconsider or the Rule 60(b) 
motion because of what you're talking about now, and then filed the Motion to Recuse and had 
something to back it up, you have them in the right order, but you don't have it in the right order 
here. (T Pg 13 L17-25 Pg 14 L 1-2) 
... and the appellant did exactly as Judge McKee stated. Appellant filed for change of 
orders under Rule 60, and a Motion for Change of venue ( also filed for contempt, but that's 
another issue) Then these motions were never heard by Judge Smyser, (what appellant asserts to 
be a violation of due process) but were passed on to Judge DeMeyer again ... who then dismissed 
everything. 
MR. VAN HOOK: May I ask a question, Judge? If I were to file a motion 
tomorrow, a Motion to Modify, who is going to hear the case? 
THE COURT: Right now? 
MR.VAN HOOK: Would it be Judge DeMeyer? 
THE COURT: I don't know. Probably. 
MR. VAN HOOK: So that shows that he has jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: He does. 
MR. VAN HOOK: Okay. So that would be at any time. 
THE COURT: Well, but then there would also be an active case. And, frankly, 
the Motion to Recuse and the motion -- I guess it's got to be without prejudice 
because there isn't anything to recuse on. If you file a new motion tomorrow, and 
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then file a Motion to Recuse, now you've got something to file -- there's an active 
case pending for him to act on. (T Pg 41 L14-25 & Pg 42 Ll-6) 
Further support that the District Court of Appeals advised Appellant to file under Rule 60 
THE COURT: There are still some rights under 60, but they're on down -- 60(c), 
(d), and (e) and whatnot (T Pg. 14 L 17-19) 
THE COURT: Well, the standpoint of an affidavit is probably adequate for her to say on 
information and belief because Ms. Grant told her that Ms. Grant was present when there was an 
outburst. She goes back and tells Ms. Stretch, and Ms. Stretch puts it in the affidavit. (T Pg27 L 
11-16) 
THE COURT: Absolutely. I have no problem at all understanding that the judge is 
going to look at this and say this is wrong. This side of the case is wrong. I have no problem at 
all understanding that. (T Pg 30 L5-8) 
THE COURT: The impartiality of the judge -- he's not expected to be a robot. The judge 
is a human being. He's expected to bring into the decision making process the normal human 
reactions that a human being would have to the circumstances in front of him. He evaluates 
testimony from the standpoint of the reasonable person. The standpoint of a burden of proof 
being a preponderance of the evidence requires subjective evaluation, not as a robot, not as a 
computer, but as a human being. (T Pg 36 L5-14) 
THE COURT: And I understand based upon what you've told me that there may be some 
basis for being upset. If they screwed up this order, and it was supposed to order that your 
children not have anything to do with these Eldridge folks, and that should have been in the 
order, and it wasn't. (T Pg43 Ll 7-22) 
Respondents Brief appears to be missing from the record that was sent to the Supreme 
Court after Appellant had objected to the first record that was to be sent up. It was on the 
original batch of documents on pages 904 - 937, so there was no need to object to it being 
missing ... but for some reason it now appears to be missing from the record. 
Appellants Response filed Mar. 30, 2017 (Record Pages 1269-1273) 
Memorandum Decision On Appeal (Record pages 1274 - 1280) 
In the appeal, after all briefs were filed, Appellant requested Oral Arguments, and the 
District Court in its discretion decided not to hear oral arguments. 
On page 4 of the Memorandum Decision on Appeal (Record page 1277) Judge McKee 
states, "the separate lawsuit appears to be nothing more than a rehash of Van Hook's complaints 
against the judge in this case that have all been aired and ruled upon before." The Respondent 
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must demonstrate EXACTLY where these have been ruled on. The fact is, they have not been 
ruled on, nor have they even been heard by any court. Every single thing filed by Appellant gets 
dismissed without considering anything in the motions or actions. (which gives the appearance 
of more than one judge in the 3rd judicial district assisting in preventing justice.) The claim that 
all these complaints have been heard before and dismissed was also something the Respondent 
claimed this in her brief, which is a fraud on the court, and the Appeals Court mirrored her claim 
without verifying any of this, which is an abuse of discretion and erroneous. (referring back to 
the Transcript section already quoted, Judge McKee, on more than one occasion in the 1st 
Appeal Hearing, made it clear the Appellants issues with the Court and certain Officers of the 
Court were legitimate. It seems apparent that Judge McKee changed his position somewhere 
between the time he ruled on the first appeal and the time the Appellant filed the 2nd appeal. 
The basic overview of the time frame on these things (Memorandum Decision on Appeal filed 
Oct. 18, 2017, New Motions were filed in the Magistrate Court on Oct. 20, 2017, Order denying 
Motions was filed on Dec 14, 2016, New Notice of Appeal filed Dec. 16, 2017) Appellant didn't 
waste much time at all in filing the new motions after the 1st appeal was unsuccessful. The 
filings were as advised by the Appellant Court in the 1st appeal, After the Motions were all 
dismissed by Gary DeMeyer, Appellant again didn't waste time in filing the appeal to the 
District Court again. It seems very inappropriate and appears to be an abuse of discretion for 
Judge McKee to advise Appellant on how to proceed, for appellant to proceed as advised, for 
those motions to be thrown out, for appellant to file a new appeal, and for Judge McKee to 
dismiss the appeal and state all the issues have already been ruled on when that is nowhere near 
. being true. Appellant asserts Judge McKee is in error and has abused his discretion. 
On page 5 of the Memorandum Decision on Appeal (Record page 1278) Judge McKee 
states, "There has been no evidence presented that Judge DeMeyer is either a party to or has any 
personal interest in the outcome of this case." Appellant argues that all the actions of Judge 
DeMeyer must be reviewed, and should the Supreme Court conclude as Appellant asserts, that 
Gary DeMeyer has on numerous occasions deliberately violated Due Process, Equal Protection, 
and/or other civil rights of the Appellant, then there would be 'Personal Interest' in the Case by 
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Judge DeMeyer. 
When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his 
constitutional rights he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts no 
longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudices. [386 U.S. 547,568]. 
Conclusion on page 6 of the of the Memorandum Decision on Appeal (Record page 
1279) 
"Since the remaining issues were neither argued nor supported by authority, they 
are waived and therefore dismissed". 
Other issues are clearly argued and supported by authority _on the Appellants Brief pages 
7-9 (Record pages 1258-1260) 
In the Appellants Brief it is argued that Appellants Motion for Change of and/or New 
Orders was filed under Rule 60 (b) and had no time restraint under (4), (5), or (6), and that 
Appellant clearly stated Changes in Circumstance in the actual Motion and Affidavit. This issue 
was clearly argued and supported by authority, and the District Court is in Error for concluding 
this issue was never argued or supported by authority. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Title Vill Rule 60 (b) (6) are Grounds for Relief from a 
Final Judgment for any other reason that justifies relief, has no time limitations or restrictions per 
IRCP Title Vill 60 (c) (1). As such, the Supreme Court should hear the grievances of the 
Appellant, review the record and conclude that the Appellant clearly has legitimate grievances 
that concern misconduct and/or frauds committed by the Respondent and Officers of the Court in 
CV-2014-7409 in Canyon County, and CV-2014-3311 in Adams County. 
When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional 
rights he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a 
"minister" of his own prejudices. [386 U.S. 547, 568]. U.S. Supreme Court Reports, PIERSON 
v. RAY, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) 386 U.S. 547 PIERSON ET AL v. RAY ET AL. This case law 
applies and was argued. It applies to every single motion that the Magistrate Court dismissed, 
and was not properly considered, and the District Court is in error for failing to consider this. 
"The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a 
crime" ... "a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law". Simmons 
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). This case law applies and was argued. It 
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Conclusion 
applies to every single motion that the Magistrate Court dismissed, and was not 
properly considered, and the District Court is in error for failing to consider this .. 
This case is absolutely full of Due Process Violations, Equal Protections Violations, 
Frauds on the Court, Judicial Misconduct, Attorney Misconduct, multiple inconsistencies in 
testimonies, and ultimately what has led to a Termination of the Appellants Parental Rights with 
absolutely nothing to support the reasoning for this. Ms. Stretch has argued on several occasions 
that Mr. Van Hook is trying to relitigate the issues, however, something cannot be RElitigated 
when it was never lawfully litigated in the first place. 
This began with Judge Meienhoffer issuing a CPO to Ms. Cannon and awarding her 
custody of the children in Adams County after it had already been decided in Canyon County 
giving Appellant full custody of the children. After this, Steven Fisher, Counsel for the 
Appellant at the time, completely failed in his responsibilities to his client, and on several 
occasions completely failed to offer any objection to the Respondents Motions (before the trial) 
allowing the Motions to go through unchecked. This is what appellant calls "Stacking the 
Deck". 
Appellant attempted several motions (pre trial after Mr. Fisher took leave) all of which 
were denied without reasonable consideration or without compliance with Due Process, among 
other things. 
The trial was conducted without compliance with due process, with favoritism towards 
the respondent, while refusing to allow testimony, ignoring evidence, elimination of a 
consolidated case, destruction of evidence and then ultimately a decision that was not consistent 
with the evidence and testimony, while adding things that were never testified to, an order 
written solely by the Respondents Counsel as ordered by the Court, that was inconsistent with 
the Order actually given by the Court. 
Appellant obtained legal counsel (Virginia Bond) for the purpose of appealing the case, 
which turned into Motions for reconsideration and a retrial. These motions were dismissed 
without the approval of the Appellant, followed by counsel taking leave from the case. 
Appellant filed motions again, Pro Se, without the aid of legal counsel, but those motions had 
34 
been submitted in clear enough fashion that the Court should have considered them. There is 
absolutely nothing in this case that comes anywhere close to sounding like justice, and now the 
Supreme Court must determine that there are more than reasonable grounds for appellant to insist 
upon a Motion under Rule 60 (b) (6) of the IRCP, which should be followed by an Order under 
IRCP Rule 60 (d) (3) dismissing all of CV 2014-7409 post Default Judgment. The Supreme 
Court must also, for the sake of Justice, order an immediate investigation into the conduct of the 
Judges and Attorneys involved and all other persons who played a direct role in anything to do 
with this case and the creating and enforcement of an illegal order. 
Questions of Law to the Supreme Court: 
Are the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct actual Laws that Attorneys in the State of 
Idaho are compelled to abide by? 
Is the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct a set of Laws that Judges in the State of Idaho are 
compelled to abide by? 
Does a 'Contract in Fact' exist between a litigant and their retained Attorney that requires 
the Attorney to comply with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct? 
What is the distinction between a 'Harmless Error' (per IRCP Rule 61), and an error that 
is Not Harmless? And who gets to decide what is or isn't harmless? 
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